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ABSTRACT
Tapp, Kristy Marie. M.S. The University of Memphis. May 2010. Cognitive 
Cruise Control: Investigating how Context affects the Momentum of Cognitive Control. 
Major Professor: Rick Dale, Ph.D.
In the present studies a coordination dynamics perspective is taken to explore the 
interplay of perception and action in a continuous dual-task paradigm. Two experiments 
will be conducted using an action-dynamics methodology, through tracking response 
trajectories with the Nintendo Wii remote, which allows for analysis of how a response 
unfolds over time. The real-time data (i.e., the response trajectories) are expected to 
reflect an intriguing pattern of cognitive competition as attention adapts to trial context. 
The purpose of this work is twofold: a) exploring whether attention/cognitive control is 
best characterized in terms of its structural limitations (i.e., bottleneck) or its flexible, 
dynamic properties and, b) investigate if any patterns emerge in the response trajectories 
that may be indicative of the cognitive system adjusting to conform to the unique 
combination of experimental parameters.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Every decision we make, whether it is determining which job to apply for 
or just deciding to pick up a cup of coffee, is possible because the cognitive 
system coordinates the processing of the numerous stimuli we are constantly 
bombarded with, giving rise to complex nested bouts of perception and action 
(Kelso, 2002; Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2003). Information processing and 
ultimately higher-level cognitive processes never occur within a vacuum but are 
instead modulated by numerous factors such as context and current goals. In order 
to make any decision and subsequently act on it, the cognitive system must settle 
on a current goal, reconcile the competition among seemingly countless stimuli, 
and elect to initiate an appropriate response. All the while it must be flexible 
enough to inhibit unexpected distractors, such as a dog jumping into your lap as 
you reach for that coffee. 
Historically, attempts to formulate theories of such cognitive control have 
focused on explaining dual-task limitations of the cognitive system. The classic 
theories, most notably the cognitive bottleneck theory (CBT), were built on the 
single key assumption that the cognitive system conducts processing through an 
assembly line of discrete, serial stages (for recent discussion see: Brisson & 
Jolicoeur, 2007; Jentzsch, Leuthold, & Ulrich, 2007; Johnston & McCann, 2006; 
Sigman & Dehaene, 2006; Vachon & Tremblay, 2006). The CBT has been shown 
to predict responding in natural decision competition situations (Levy, Pashler, & 
2
Boer, 2006), but it originally sought to describe the pattern of results elicited by 
the psychological refractory period (PRP) paradigm (Welford, 1952). In the 
typical PRP design, participants are presented with two stimuli separated by 
varying stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). Responding to the two stimuli 
typically requires arbitrary key presses in response to different tasks, from 
relatively low-level perceptual decisions (Johnston & McCann, 2006), to higher-
level cognitive decisions such as numeral identification (Sigman & Dehaene, 
2008). The common finding is that if the second stimulus (S2) is presented within 
300 ms of the first stimulus (S1), the response to S2 is delayed (Sigman & 
Dehaene, 2008). Moreover, the reaction time to S2 is longer in PRP experiments 
than if it were to be completed in isolation. 
The CBT posits that information processing resulting in a response 
requires three discrete stages. The first stage is responsible for perceptual 
processing, the second stage consists of central operations (e.g., linking of 
stimulus-response mappings), and the third stage deals with the motor response. 
According to the CBT the first and third stages can proceed in parallel. However, 
a passive first-come, first-served serial processor characterizes the second stage. 
Therefore, while the central stage is processing S1 all other stimuli must wait. 
This deferment of access to the central stage of processing is thought to be the 
cause of delayed response times to S2. Therefore, past research has shown that the 
CBT is a powerful explanation of the common dual-task limitations, such as the 
PRP effect (Shin, Cho, Lien, & Proctor, 2007).
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However, studies on decision-making and motor programming (e.g., Gold 
& Shadlen, 2000, 2001, 2003) bring to light the possibility that the basic 
assumption of serial, discrete-stage theories, which portray the cognitive system 
as an assembly line, cannot wholly account for how the underlying neural 
substrate operates. For example, Gold and Shadlen (2000) demonstrate that 
decisions are based on continuously accumulating information, potentially all the 
way into premotor regions dedicated to enacting a decision (see also Spivey, 2007 
for a review of diverse evidence of this). Thus, accounts of information 
processing should incorporate the notion that the cognitive system is built upon an 
interconnected network of subsystems that perform their individual duties under 
the influence of uninterrupted updates from the constituent parts of the whole 
system. 
One such approach is coordination dynamics (Kelso, 1984). Viewed from 
this perspective, processing limitations seen in dual-tasking situations occur from 
a number of dynamic interactions across the cognitive system. It may not be the 
case that a single iron gate stands between perceptual processing and central (i.e., 
decisional/response-selection) stages of processing, where stimuli line up in a 
single-file line waiting for their turn to pass in a first-come, first-served fashion, 
presumably forming the infamous cognitive bottleneck.  Moreover, processing a 
perceptual event and responding to it is a complex task that entails many subtasks, 
which includes but is not limited to: a) integration of the object’s features, b) 
perceptual categorization, c) establishing an episodic memory trace of the object, 
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d) identification of the object, e) retrieving possible relevant information about the 
object from long-term memory, f) integrating bottom-up and top-down 
components, g) calling upon the relevant task/goal information, h) mapping the 
object to an appropriate response, i) developing the intention to act, j) planning 
the movement, k) initiating the response, and l) controlling the act of responding. 
The mechanisms responsible for each subtask of the process do not exist in their 
own discrete stage per se, instead moving from one component to another is a 
graded process. The underlying mechanisms responsible for each aspect in the 
sequence of events that results in information processing are continuously 
receiving information from and influencing each other. In this way, information 
processing is an autonomous self-organizing and highly flexible phenomenon. 
Furthermore, although each individual mechanism has capacity limitations, not all 
mechanisms reach maximum capacity on a predetermined timescale or at a single 
step in the process. Therefore, at any moment in time a variable number of these 
mechanisms can perform in parallel while others, which may have reached their 
capacity limits, operate in a more serial manner. 
Importantly, taking a coordination dynamics approach provides an 
explanation for why authors have found conflicting evidence for the number and 
loci of information processing bottlenecks. Sigman and Deheane (2006) are just 
one example of the many researchers whose results support a single bottleneck at 
the response-selection stage of processing, while Johnston and McCann’s (2006) 
findings indicated a bottleneck closer to the perceptual processing stage. DeJong 
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(1993) suggested multiple bottlenecks including a response initiation bottleneck 
and a response-selection bottleneck that could also be congested by perceptual 
categorization.  It may be that they are all correct. The coordination dynamics 
perspective suggests that information processing flexibly conforms to aspects of 
the task at hand by altering the way in which the cognitive system controls how 
processing resources are divided and shared. For example, if a student is 
answering a quantitative question on a test (e.g., GRE, ACT), the cognitive 
system may construct an information processing structure that tends to operate in 
a more serial manner, focusing most of its resources on a single task at a time. On 
the other hand, when driving, the cognitive system allows the driver to handle the 
complex task(s) of driving as well as talking on a cell phone, while still 
monitoring the environment for unexpected events, such as a child running out 
into the street. 
Broadly speaking, the purpose of the current work is to investigate 
cognitive control in an experimental dual-task paradigm. Specifically, how 
attention changes the way it processes information within varying perceptual 
contexts by surveying the process of dynamic, coordinated cognitive control as it 
unfolds over time. In what follows, a few pertinent models that provide theoretical 
links between the classic structural bottleneck theory and coordination dynamics 
are reviewed. Then, action dynamics and an introduction to the novel 
methodology presently employed for collecting real-time, dual-task cognitive 
control are briefly described. Finally, two exploratory experiments are presented. 
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Competition for Processing Resources
Neural dynamic approaches to vision and attention, such as Desimone and 
Duncan’s (1995) biased-competition model of visual attention posit a dynamic, 
active process, which opposes the long-standing theoretical construct of the 
attentional spotlight (Treisman, 1982). Instead of a central executive directing 
attention around the visual field, their biased-competition model purports that 
attention is an end result of settling competition within the cognitive system. 
Desimone and Duncan (1995) suggest that the cognitive system is confronted 
with competition numerous times between stimulus presentation and the motor 
response to that stimulus. As each stage of visual processing is traversed the 
processing becomes more complex and the amount of the visual field a neuron is 
responsible for increases. As the neurons (i.e., “processing resources”) become 
responsible for processing larger areas of the visual field, those areas must 
compete with each other for the processing resources. This competition is 
resolved by means of a biasing attentional template (i.e., working memory) that 
monitors task-relevant information. Whichever stimulus wins the competition for 
the limited processing resources is the stimulus that can be consciously reported 
and responded to.
Potter, Straub, and O’Connor (2002) have proposed a discrete-stage theory 
of information processing in dual-task situations, which incorporates the cognitive 
competition seen in Desimone and Duncan’s (1995) model, that sought to explain 
dual-task limitations in the attentional blink (AB) paradigm. Their model, termed 
7
the two-stage competition model, suggests that there are two levels of central 
processing. In the first, all presented stimuli are processed on a preliminary basis. 
This initial processing “scans” the stimuli for characteristics that match a stored 
representation of task-relevant information. If the “scan” reveals that a stimulus 
does have these features, that stimulus will begin to attract processing resources to 
itself. Once a certain threshold is met, the stimulus then enters the second level, 
which is a limited capacity stage that is responsible for classic central processing 
tasks (i.e., stimulus-response mapping). It may be reasonable to postulate that 
Potter et al.’s theory is similar to Treisman’s (1982) attenuation model. However, 
the attenuation model only deals with processing information in the order that it is 
received, as does the classic bottleneck theory. In Potter et al.’s model, the order 
in which a stimulus enters a limited capacity stage of processing is active and 
dynamic. For example, if S2 is presented before S1 enters the second level of 
central processing and the initial “scan” of S2 finds task-relevant features, the two 
stimuli will compete for the limited processing resources. The stimulus that enters 
the second level first does so because it has attracted sufficient resources first. The 
notion that a subsequently presented stimulus can “pull” processing resources 
away from a previously presented stimulus will serve as a principle theoretical 
question in the present studies.
Integration of Perception and Action
As previously mentioned, coordination dynamics proposes that cognition 
arises from how information in the form of raw sensations percolate through the 
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brain. Individual neurons begin to process that information by activating networks 
that begin to autonomously organize by coupling or decoupling until a unique 
structure materializes for each perceptual experience. The interaction of these 
nested subsystems continuously flows into each other. The graded process is not 
limited to perception and cognition but also flows into action (e.g., Balota & 
Abrams 1995; see Song & Nakayama, 2009; Spivey & Dale, 2006, for a review). 
Even as early as 1908, Pillsbury noted, “There is no act of attention that in 
unaccompanied by some motor process” (p.12). Moreover, Hommel, Musseler, 
Aschersleben, and Prinz (2001) propose that perception and action planning are 
“indistinguishable”. More recently, Caroso-Leite and Gorea (2009) suggested that 
both perception and action planning have their genesis within a single processing 
network and even go as far as to posit that motor movements are a more sensitive 
measure than conscious perceptual identification. In fact, the decreased level of 
perceptual sensitivity is well documented in attentional blink literature in that 
even if a subject cannot report the identity of a secondary target presented within 
a stream of distractors, it is processed enough to cause priming effects (Vachon & 
Tremblay, 2006). 
Therefore, in the tradition of Tipper, Howard, and Jackson (1997), action 
dynamics explores the variability of response movements as they unfold in order 
to elucidate the cognitive processes that enabled the movement. Within the novel 
action dynamics methodology that we employ, participants respond to stimuli that 
are presented within a continuous dual-task paradigm by pointing with a Nintendo 
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Wii remote instead of arbitrary key presses to indicate responses, as is usually 
done in typical dual-task experiments. This methodology provides a rich source of 
arm-movement data that provides insights into the dynamics of cognitive 
processing itself (Dale, Kehoe, & Spivey, 2007; Farmer, Cargill, Hindy, Dale, & 
Spivey, 2007; Freeman, Ambady, Rule, & Johnson, 2008; Spivey, Grosjean, & 
Knoblich, 2005). 
The Present Study
The purpose of the present experiments is to “uncork” the bottleneck in 
order to peer inside at the inner workings of the autonomously coordinated 
cognitive processes that yield the behavioral regularities commonly referred to as 
the bottleneck. The principle measures employed in typical investigations into 
dual-task limitations (e.g., PRP) are reaction time and error rates, which only 
provide data on the end result of information processing. For both of the studies in 
this work, focus will be shifted to exploring the process itself by modifying the 
typical PRP paradigm to produce a continuous dual-task experiment. The 
paradigm is referred to as “continuous” because it continually records data as the 
responses unfold, not just when the response is selected, reflecting the 
progression of information processing and the competition experienced by the 
cognitive system.
In the following, purely exploratory experiments, the primary question 
being asked is centered on whether attention/cognitive control is best 
characterized in terms of its structural limitations (i.e., bottleneck) or its flexible, 
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dynamic properties. It is hypothesized that if information processing is a passive 
first-come, first-served phenomenon, as the classic structural bottleneck theory 
proposes, participants should always respond to the stimuli in the order they were 
presented and the response trajectories should reveal direct movement to the 
correct response option in a serial manner. However, if information processing is 
an active process within which stimuli compete for processing resources as 
proposed by coordination dynamics and Potter et al. (2002), the response 
movements should reflect this by displaying deviations in the trajectories 
modulated by the presentation of the second stimulus. In other words, the second 
stimulus will “pull” on the responses as their progression is tracked, lending 
support to an active, dynamic interaction among stimuli during processing.
A secondary point of interest radiates from a central coordination/action 
dynamics prediction. That is, that the emerging systematic patterns within the 
response trajectories may be indicative of particular structure(s) that the cognitive 
system produces in order to process the information based on the unique 
combination of experimental parameters. The patterns will be stable as long as the 
experimental context remains uniform. Manipulating the experimental parameters 
(e.g., stimuli salience, presentation duration, temporal proximity, etc.) would 
require the cognitive system to construct different processing structures resulting 
in differing response trajectory patterns. Furthermore, because information 
processing is situated within ever-changing environmental contexts (e.g., one 
cannot step into the same river twice), the response trajectory patterns should 
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adjust, and perhaps even adapt, to the experimental contexts. In other words, the 
systematic trajectory patterns should be consistent for each of the experiments 
(e.g., responses to trails that consist of the shortest SOA should be approximately 
tantamount in each experiment, providing that memory, perceptual load, etc. 
remains the same). However, the time course of these patterns may flexibly adjust 
to the individual experimental contexts. For example, SOAs in one experiment 
could be 150, 500, and 999 ms and in a second experiment the SOAs could be 30, 
100, and 200 ms. Trajectories of trials that include the shortest SOAs of each 





The first experiment investigates whether a subsequently presented 
stimulus is capable of pulling processing resources away from a previously 
presented one, as predicted by the Potter et al. (2002) model, while using SOAs 
that are commonly used in PRP experiments. 
Methods
Subjects
 Participants included 19 (15 females, mean age 20.5) University of Memphis 
undergraduates from the psychology subject pool who participated for extra credit 
in their introductory psychology course that self-reported normal or corrected to 
normal vision and hearing. 
Interface Display and Device
The experiment took place in an oblong laboratory room (3.8 m x 61.8 m). 
An Epson LCD projector and Apple Mac mini were placed on a small 76 cm high 
table that stood approximately 2.7 m away from the long wall of the room. The 
Mac mini’s display is projected onto the wall at the end of the room creating a 
display approximately 1.4 m in width (29.1° visual angle). Participants interacted 
with the experimental program by using the Nintendo Wii remote. Standing 
behind the table, participants held the Wii remote in their right hand that was 
approximately lined up with the projector’s lens. The Wii remote interfaces with 
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the Apple mini computer via a Bluetooth transfer protocol called DarwiinRemote 
(2006, Hiroaki Kimura). A Nyko infrared emitter at the base of the projected 
screen provides the remote with a frame of reference so that arm movements are 
mapped isomorphically onto x,y pixel-coordinate movements (see Figure 1). 
MATLAB Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) was used to develop the 
experimental program, produce the tone stimuli, and sample the Wii remote-
controlled cursor movements as streaming x-y coordinates at approximately 80-90 
Hz.
 
Figure 1. Experimental environment and interface. Participants stood in a 
darkened room (not shown) and placed on a headset. They interacted with the 
interface via a Nintendo Wii remote while their response trajectories were being 
recorded.
Procedure
Stimuli. In the continuous dual-task paradigm, participants performed a 
visual discrimination task (T1) and an auditory discrimination task (T2). For each 
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trial, S1 was an image of a bug (2.4° visual angle) that varied in color from red to 
blue (i.e., saliently red, ambiguously red, ambiguously blue, saliently blue). T1 
was to determine whether the presented bug was more red than blue or vice versa. 
Previously, 35 (30 females, mean age 19.8) University of Memphis 
undergraduates who reported normal or corrected to normal vision participated in 
a color norming task. Each bug stimulus was presented 6 times in random order 
on a computer screen and the participants were asked to respond by determining 
whether the bug was red or blue by typing response keys on the keyboard. Once 
normed, the bug stimuli were used as S1 in the current study. 
At varying SOAs (150, 500, 999 ms) after S1 is displayed, a tone (S2) was 
played via headphones. There were four levels of tone pitch that varied between 
low and high (300, 500, 700, 900Hz). T2 was to categorize the pitch of the tone as 
high or low. The levels of saliency in the visual and auditory discrimination tasks 
were manipulated in order to produce varying amounts of cognitive competition. 
The task difficulty increases when ambiguous stimuli are presented, therefore it is 
predicted that these trials will induce more competition within the cognitive 
system. Whereas, categorizing the salient stimuli is expected to reduce cognitive 
competition. 
Task. At the beginning of each trial a central fixation point (2.7° visual 
angle) and four response boxes (2.8° visual angle) were displayed on the screen. 
Above and below the central fixation point were response boxes labeled “blue” 
and “red” respectively. To the left and right of the central fixation point were 
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response boxes labeled “low” and “high” respectively (see Figure 2). To begin 
each trial, participants clicked the central fixation point. At that time S1 replaced 
the fixation point and then was followed by S2. 
 
Figure 2. Feedback and the experimental interface. Response order was not set. 
Participants could respond to either S1 or S2 first. (However, only  trials when S1 
was selected first were used in the analyses.) Accuracy feedback was displayed in 
the form of a red “X” to indicate incorrect selections and green check marks 
indicated correct responses. (No trials that included any  incorrect response were 
used in the analyses.)
In previous PRP studies, participants respond to each stimulus with 
different hands (e.g., Jentzsch et al., 2007; Johnston & McCann, 2006; Ruthruff & 
Pashler, 2001; see Pashler & Johnston, 1998, for a review). In the current 
experiment, responses to both stimuli are conducted through the participants’ right 
hand only. Requiring participants to respond to both stimuli through a single 
response medium was expected to increase competition within the cognitive 
system for that medium. Participants were instructed to respond by moving the 
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Wii remote-controlled cursor and clicking on the appropriate response boxes that 
correspond to S1 and S2 as quickly and as accurately as possible. Participants 
were not instructed to respond in the order the stimuli were presented but to 
respond in the order of their perceptual decisions. Feedback within the 
experimental interface was provided by the presentation of either a green check 
mark (to indicate a correct response) or a red “X” (to indicate a wrong response) 
in the selected response box. The trial ended once correct responses to both 
stimuli were selected (see Figure 2).
The instructions were explained to each participant prior to an 8 trial 
practice stage during which they were allowed to ask clarification questions about 
the experimental procedures. The researcher then initiated the experiment and left 
the room once the participant verbally acknowledged clear understanding of the 
procedures. During each session, participants went through 5 blocks of 48 trails. 
In each block every combination of bug color, tone pitch, and SOA was displayed 
exactly once in random order. Participants completed 240 total trials that lasted 
approximately 20 minutes.
Measures
The Wii remote is not fixed on a surface (as in computer-mouse studies, 
Dale et al., 2007; Spivey et al., 2005). This causes constant subtle fluctuation in 
the held-out hand. Therefore a pixel radius to define an “escape” region was used. 
Previously, Dale, Roche, Snyder, McCall (2008) used a 100-pixel escape region. 
However, for the smaller experimental display presented here it was found that a 
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100-pixel escape region was too conservative and it was thus determined that a 
50-pixel escape region would be more appropriate.
Basic Measures. Analyses for each experiment presented in this work are 
separated and displayed in two tables. The first of which displays basic response 
time measures. These measures include T1 latency, T1 reaction time, and T2 
reaction time. A latency period for T1 was calculated in milliseconds from the 
time the trial began until participant’s response movements exit the 50-pixel 
escape region, producing T1 latency. How long it took for a response to unfold 
over time serves as a second measure. T1 response time was measured from the 
onset of S1 until a correct T1 response was selected. This reflects the amount of 
time the hand is in motion towards a selection. T2 Response time was measured 
from the T1 response selection (or presentation of S2, whichever came first) to the 
selection of a correct T2 response. To analyze these dependent measures, a 3 
(SOA) x 2 (bug: salient vs. ambiguous) x 2 (tone: salient vs. ambiguous) linear 
mixed-effects model for each of the measures was conducted (using MIXED 
procedure in SPSS, with subjects as a random factor). All trials involving any 
incorrect response were removed prior to analysis. Unless otherwise noted, only 
effects significant at the .05-level are reported. All other main effects and 
interactions not mentioned are not significant. 
Dynamic Measures. The second set of analyses that were conducted for 
each experiment presented here analyzed the unfolding of the responses and are 
grouped in tables titled x-axis deviation results. These analyses focused on 
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measuring how variables such as SOA, bug color and tone pitch affected how 
much the participant’s T1 response movements deviate along the x-axis. Since T1 
responses required only vertical movements, deviations along the x-axis serve as a 
measure of whether S2 affected T1 responses. For example, if the highest tone 
(responded to towards the right response option) is presented before or during 
movement, x-axis fluctuation towards the right may be observed. These x-axis 
deviations during T1 responses were analyzed at 50 ms intervals after the 
response trajectories exited the escape region. If the response movements 
captured cognitive competition, then any x-coordinate deviation present in the 
evolving trajectories should reflect the direction of the correct S2 response. To 
analyze these dependent measures, we employed the use of 3 (SOA) x 2 (sound 
type: high vs. low) linear mixed-effects models for each 50 ms interval, from 50 
ms until 400 ms after S2 was presented (using MIXED procedure in SPSS, with 




Basic Response Time Measures
T1 latency was significantly reduced for saliently colored bugs by 
approximately 37 ms. Similarly, RT1 and RT2 were significantly increased by 
ambiguous stimuli by approximately  15 and 71 ms respectively. Also, lower 
SOAs induced faster reaction times for both tasks by  approximately 87 ms for T1 
and 167 ms for T2. These findings are displayed in Table 1.
 
Table 1
Results of Basic Response Time Measures
Dynamic Measures
There was a significant main effect of sound type (i.e., whether S2 was a 
high or low pitch tone) on the x-axis deviations in the T1 response trajectories 
from 50 ms to 400 ms after S2 was presented, F(1, 8,180.4) = 4.0, p < .05. This 







Ambig. 512, 32.2*** 1,312, 82*** 705, 48.5***
Salient 475 1297 634
150ms 1,271, 15.9*** 608, 107.9***
500ms 1284 625
999ms 1358 775
*** p < .001.
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separately. An additional outcome when analyzing the bug color subsets was that 
there was a significant interaction between sound type and SOA. The significant 
findings are listed in Table 2. Although not statistically significant when pooling 
the bug color subsets, this interaction is plotted at 50 and 250 ms into the T1 
response trajectory in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Mean x-axis deviation at 50 ms (top) and 250 ms (bottom) into T1 
response trajectory for Experiment 1. Higher x-axis deviation reflects more 
rightward movements (movements towards high-tone responses). Lower x-axis 
































50-400 22.0***253.9***37.3*** 55.3***24.0***34.0*** 4.0* 200.7***
50 5.9** 5.5** 10.9***
100 13.2** 3.9* 12.3***
150 28.7***4.0* 6.3**
200 8.0** 49.4*** 19.4***
250 6.4** 51.5*** 5.1* 5.4* 33.7***
300 7.9** 47.0***3.7* 16.0***10.0***5.4* 47.1***
350 4.4* 34.3***4.5* 22.5***17.3***8.7** 3.7* 47.3***
400 30.8***14.7*** 15.3***26.2***8.0** 5.4* 54.2***




The data from the current study are in line with previous investigations 
showing that task difficulty is manifested in response trajectories (Dale et al., 
2008). Contrary to most PRP results, we found that as SOA decreased, RT1 and 
RT2 also decreased. One explanation for this finding could be that participants 
took as much time as they were allotted to process S1 and that the presentation of 
S2 cued them to initiate a S1 response. Furthermore, this result is likely unique to 
this experiment because T1 and T2 responses were collapsed into a single 
medium, as opposed to responding to each task with separate hands as is typically 
the case in classic PRP studies. Moreover, programming a single response in the 
left hand and then another in the right hand may require more time than 
programming two responses for one hand.
 The findings of the x-axis deviation analysis show (relative) movement in 
the direction of the correct response to S2 at the shortest SOA, but away from the 
correct response at the longer SOAs. This occurs as soon as 50 ms into the T1 
response movement. These results suggest that S2 is being processed very early 
into the T1 response, and competing with it, resulting in a drift toward the correct 
T2 response at the shortest SOA. The pull away from the correct T2 response at 
longer SOAs may be indicative of active inhibition. Previous work by McSorley, 
Haggard, and Walker (2006; see also Tipper et al., 1997, for manual trajectories) 
has shown that saccade trajectories also show a similar pattern of deviation 
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toward a distractor when the saccade latency is less than 200 ms but the eyes 





The results of Experiment 1 seem to lend support to the notion that a 
secondary stimulus can pull processing resources away from a previously 
presented one, as the Potter et al. (2002) model proposed. This finding in turn 
begins to suggest that perhaps cognitive control is better characterized by its 
flexible, dynamic properties than its structural limitations. We conduct a second 
experiment in order to investigate this possibility further. The data resulting from 
the first experiment fall in line exactly with McSorley et al.’s (2006) findings. 
However, it leaves the door open to more questions. Is the 200 ms mark, 
separating attracted versus repulsed trajectories, particularly special? Is cognitive 
control always subject to this seemingly structural time course? Or, does it adjust 
to the experimental context?  Experiment 2 uses SOAs that were reduced by 
magnitude of 5 from Experiment 1, which more closely resembled those used by 
Potter et al. (2002). If the 200 ms mark is in fact an innate structural limitation 
then all of the T1 response trajectories should exhibit a pull toward the correct S2 
response. However, If cognitive control dynamically adjusts, as coordination 
dynamics proposes, then the pattern of the T1 response trajectories should mirror 
those of Experiment 1, in that trajectories of the shortest SOA trials should be 
attracted while trajectories of the two longer SOA trials should be repulsed even 




 Participants included 19 (11 females, mean age 19.3) University of Memphis 
undergraduates from the psychology subject pool who participated for extra credit 
in their introductory psychology course that self-reported normal or corrected to 
normal vision and hearing. 
Procedure
Procedures for Experiment 2 were identical to Experiment 1 except that 





Basic Response Time Measures
T1 latency was significantly reduced for saliently colored bugs by 
approximately 16 ms. Similarly, RT1 and RT2 were significantly increased by 
ambiguous stimuli by approximately  162 and 48 ms respectively. The previous 
effect of SOA from Experiment 1 was not retained. These findings are displayed 
in Table 3.
Table 3







Ambig. 529, 4.5* 1,401, 83.7*** 667, 11.4***
Salient 513 1239 619
* p < .05. *** p < .001.
 
 Dynamic Measures
 As in the first experiment, there was a significant main effect of sound 
type (i.e., whether S2 was a high or low pitch tone) on the x-axis deviations in the 
T1 response trajectories from 50 ms to 400 ms after S2 was presented, F(1, 
9,166.7)= 31.7, p < .001. However, unlike Experiment 1, there was also a 
significant interaction between sound type and SOA even before the trials were 
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divided by bug color type. The significant findings are listed in Table 4 and the 
interaction is plotted at 50 and 250 ms into the T1 response trajectory in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Mean x-axis deviation at 50 ms (top) and 250 ms (bottom) into T1 































50-400 23.3***251.4*** 14.4***264.0***10.2*** 31.7***513.1***7.7**
50 97.4***17.3*** 69.5*** 166.7***15.6***
100 77.1***11.1** 37.9*** 110.6***6.8**
150 75.7***9.4** 50.9*** 124.8***5.6**
200 61.0*** 51.7*** 113.0***
250 43.0*** 52.1*** 96.0***
300 7.1** 33.6*** 36.5*** 6.5** 70.2***
350 8.4** 21.8*** 3.6* 40.2*** 11.1***59.9***
400 10.2** 23.5*** 11.9***26.0*** 21.3***48.5***




 The effects of SOA in the response time findings of Experiment 1 were not 
replicated in Experiment 2. This is presumably due to that fact that the shortened 
SOAs of Experiment 2 did not allow participants the luxury of extra processing, 
or cognitive slack, time. 
In Experiment 1, inhibition was not evident in trials with the 150 ms SOA. 
Interestingly, in Experiment 2 inhibition of the T2 response was observed in trials 
with the 100 ms SOA. Although the time course of inhibition is not consistent, in 
both experiments the shortest SOA yielded a pull toward the distracting S2 while 
the longer SOAs seemed to indicate active inhibition. This pattern provides more 




The primary question of this work was: Is attention/cognitive control best 
characterized in terms of its structural limitations (i.e., bottleneck) or its flexible, 
dynamic properties? The subject is considered from the viewpoint that perception, 
cognitive operations, and bodily movement are all part of a complex dynamical 
system. Additionally, this perspective is used to facilitate a more in-depth peek 
into the “black box” during dual-task information processing. By analyzing the 
action-dynamics data provided in both experiments, scrutinizing how the response 
unfolds in real-time provided evidence that the cognitive system does actively 
adjust to changing experimental contexts.  This finding falls in line with 
neurophysiological evidence that processing limitations may not be due to a strict, 
structural bottleneck that occurs at a predetermined point in information 
processing. Instead, even if a common underlying neural substrate is responsible 
for information-processing bottleneck(s), an “adaptive coding mechanism” is 
responsible for aligning task-specific, stimulus-response mappings yielding 
flexible limitations that could occur in perceptual and/or response stages of 
processing (Ivanoff, Branning, & Marois, 2009).
Context and Cognitive Control
The secondary question addressed in this work was: Are there any 
emerging patterns in the response trajectories that may be indicative of the 
cognitive system adjusting to conform to the unique combination of experimental 
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parameters. Results from both experiments lent support to the notion that 
characterizing the cognitive system in terms of its dynamic flexibility is perhaps 
doing it more justice than focusing on its limitations, because a specific time 
course required for inhibition to emerge was not seen. Moreover, changing the 
SOAs within the experimental contexts modulated when the cognitive system 
experienced competition and inhibition. This finding demonstrated that the 
cognitive system takes into consideration the relative speed of stimulus 
presentation and flexibly adapts so that it is able to temporarily inhibit 
subsequently presented stimuli while a previous stimulus is being tended to. That 
is, instead of there being an inherent structure by which attention is directed 
resulting in fixed amounts of processing time based on task difficulty, attention 
adapts to the trial context by adjusting the way information is processed by 
creating new “structures” for each experience. Essentially, coming to a decision 
reflects a nonlinear process by which instability of the components within the 
cognitive system is temporarily stabilized by the coming together of those 
components (Johnson, Spencer, & Schöner 2008). Therefore, an attractive 
explanation of the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 is that when presented with the 
specific combination of context, current goal, and working memory load the 
cognitive system adapts in a consistent fashion. This allows T1 response 
movements in the shortest SOA trials in both experiments to be pulled toward the 
correct S2 response while the trajectories of trials with longer SOAs demonstrate 
inhibition. Evaluating cognitive control for processing rapidly presented 
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information is essential for understanding how attention adapts to context. 
Crucially, “rapidness” within the cognitive system is relative to trial context. In 
other words, the length of time it takes for the assorted networks within the 
cognitive system to organize themselves into an appropriate processing structure 
is not set in stone.
Conclusion
The experiments presented here are not without limitations. It is possible 
that the extent to which the stimuli compete with each other may be reduced 
because in both experiments S1 will be a constant stimulus but S2 is presented 
only briefly. While this is characteristic of most dual-task experimental designs, 
adjusting the presentation duration of S1 to reflect that of S2 may enhance 
competition among the stimuli in future studies. This adjustment may change the 
trajectory patterns because working memory will be taxed, which may cause a 
delay in the inhibition of the S2 response. Another limitation is that participants 
might have been able to make ballistic-like responses because target regions may 
have been large enough to accommodate speed over placement accuracy.  In 
future studies, reducing the size of the response boxes may provide more fine-
grained action dynamics data. 
Despite the limitations, these exploratory studies have lent support to the 
position that the behavioral regularities, which have historically been attributed to 
the cognitive bottleneck, are less structural limitations and more an emergent 
quality of the cognitive system. As with most things in nature, interactions among 
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the smallest of particles (i.e., molecules, atoms) initiate chain reactions, which 
yield the bewildering complexity of intelligent life (Kelso, 2002). In the same 
way, the cognitive system organizes itself to process information as efficiently as 
possible based on the current context. It is important to note that we propose that a 
serial, discrete-stage-like structure does not define the cognitive system but is 
self-imposed as the result of various factors being coordinated within a certain 
context. The structure may dissolve at anytime if certain factors change, causing 
the cognitive system to re-organize itself to better fit the new situation (Van Orden 
et al., 2003). Moreover, talk of supporting one theory over another may be a 
scientific oversimplification, when another conceptual strategy is quite possible: 
serial, discrete-stage theories and coordination dynamics may be integrated by 
identifying the contexts within which each holds, granting a pluralistic approach 
to executive control (cf. Dale, 2008; Navon & Miller, 2002). This work is a first 
step towards unveiling the basic processes that may give way to a bottleneck from 
a perspective that is often seen as precluding it. 
These exploratory studies investigated general issues of how the cognitive 
system is best “characterized”, which spawn more explicit questions regarding the 
“nuts and bolts” of the system. The task instructions did not specify response 
order, rather participants where encouraged to respond in the order of their 
perceptual decisions. Although, only correct trials in which participants responded 
to S1 first and S2 second were analyzed, there were trials that demonstrated the 
reverse response order. Future studies should explore what factors contribute to 
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how the cognitive system determines the order in which information is processed? 
What strategies are used to decide the most efficient way to process incoming 
stimuli? Under what conditions are these strategies most efficient? 
Finally, driving is an oft-used example in dual-tasking literature, but 
usually it demonstrates limitations. I would like to shine a different light on the 
comparison. In essence, the cognitive system can be compared to your car on the 
interstate. Typically, the speed limit is approximately 65 mph and so the most 
efficient way to drive in normal conditions is to set your speed control to 65. 
However, if the road conditions change, if the car in front of you speeds up a bit 
or slows down, you can tap the accelerate or coast buttons in order to adjust the 
momentum. It may be that the human cognitive system behaves in such a way. If 
driving on an unfamiliar road, you may drive slower; if following directions to a 
place you’ve never been before, then you deal with each street sign as it comes 
(e.g., operate in a more serial, discrete manner). On the other hand, if the traffic 
around you is going faster than usual and you are moderately familiar with the 
route then you speed up, adjusting to the speed of traffic; if you are driving an 
extremely familiar route then you can rather successfully multi-task. It all depends 
on the context within which you are operating.
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